FEDERAL COURTS—CERTIFICATION BEFORE FACIAL INVALIDATION: A RETURN TO FEDERALISM by Hardy, Beth A.
Western New England Law Review
Volume 12 12 (1990)
Issue 2 Article 3
1-1-1990
FEDERAL COURTS—CERTIFICATION
BEFORE FACIAL INVALIDATION: A
RETURN TO FEDERALISM
Beth A. Hardy
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.wne.edu/lawreview
This Notes and Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Review & Student Publications at Digital Commons @ Western New
England University School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Western New England Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital
Commons @ Western New England University School of Law. For more information, please contact pnewcombe@law.wne.edu.
Recommended Citation
Beth A. Hardy, FEDERAL COURTS—CERTIFICATION BEFORE FACIAL INVALIDATION: A RETURN TO FEDERALISM, 12 W.
New Eng. L. Rev. 217 (1990), http://digitalcommons.law.wne.edu/lawreview/vol12/iss2/3
FEDERAL COURTS-CERTIFICATION BEFORE FACIAL INVALIDA­
TION: A RETURN TO FEDERALISM 
INTRODUCTION 
A federal court is often asked to review the constitutionality of a 
state statute before a state court has had the opportunity to interpret 
the statute. A first amendment overbreadth challenge to a state stat­
ute is a common example} In such a situation, the federal'court must 
proceed with caution and restraint before invalidating the state law in 
order to avoid the possibility of unnecessary interference with a state 
regulatory program.2 On the other hand, before upholding the statute, 
the federal court must also consider the potential "chilling effect"3 on 
protected activity.4 Consequently, the Supreme Court has held that 
"[i]n accommodating these competing interests . . . a state statute 
should not be deemed facially invalid unless it is not readily subject to 
1. The first amendment overbreadth doctrine permits a federal court to invalidate a 
federal or state statute because it is susceptible of application to a substantial amount of 
protected expression. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 768-70 (1982). See infra notes 
67-78 and accompanying text for a discussion of the first amendment overbreadth doctrine. 
2. Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 216 (1975). 
3. "Chilling effect" is a term of art in constitutional law that focuses attention on the 
practical consequences of state action and its effect on individual conduct. See generally 
Schauer, Fear. Risk and the First Amendment: Unraveling the "Chilling Effect", 58 B.U.L. 
REv. 685 (1978); Note, The Chilling Effect in Constitutional Law, 69 CoLUM. L. REv. 808, 
808 (1969). A "chilling" of constitutional rights occurs when an individual must choose 
between risking prosecution for engaging in some conduct or foregoing that conduct. The 
deterrence arises from the fear that lawful conduct may be punished through prosecution 
under a government regulation not specifically directed at the protected activity. Schauer, 
supra, at 693. The chilling effect is most frequently noted in first amendment cases, but can 
apply to any individual right setting. Note, supra, at 808; see also Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 
413 U.S. 601, 612 (1973) (A statute's very existence may cause other individuals not before 
the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or expression.); Dombrowski v. 
Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 487 (1965) (noting that the chilling effect may derive from the very 
fact of prosecution, regardless of its success or failure). 
4. Erznoznik, 422 U.S. at 216 (recognizing "that a demonstrably overbroad statute 
... may deter the legitimate exercise of First Amendment rights"). Even if the law is 
upheld, it may not be clear what behavior the statute prohibits. Error and uncertainty in 
the legal system make it difficult to predict the outcome of litigation. For instance, laws 
may be erroneously declared or improperly applied to the facts. Thus, a chilling effect may 
always be present because of the "fear that lawful conduct may nonetheless be punished 
because of the fallibility inherent in the legal process." See Schauer, supra note 3, at 694­
95. 
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a narrowing constI'Uction by the state courts,"S and "its deterrent ef­
fect on legitimate expression is both real and substantial."6 
A federal court reviewing the constitutionality of an unconstI'Ued 
state statute may proceed in one of three ways. First, under the doc­
trine established in Railroad Commission v. Pullman CO.7 ("Pullman 
abstention"), a federal court can decline to adjudicate the federal con­
stitutional issue until a state court has had the opportunity to constI'Ue 
the statute authoritatively.s Abstention is a discretionary power9 
which federal courts should invoke only when a definitive I'Uling on 
the state issue will terminate or substantially alter the federal contro­
versy.1O In addition, the costly nature of abstention II works against its 
application when the statute allegedly abridges free expression or dis­
courages protected activities. 12 Thus, federal courts may opt to I'Ule 
on the merits of the controversy without the benefit of an authoritative 
state interpretation. 
The second option, proceeding to the merits, defeats the purpose 
of Pullman abstention, which is to recognize state independence and 
maintain an efficient federal jUdiciary. 13 Furthermore, in the absence 
of an authoritative constI'Uction of the state statute, it is often difficult 
to define precisely the constitutional question presented. 14 
The third option is to invoke a state certification procedure, a 
5. Erznoznik, 422 u.s. at 216 (citing Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 497 
(1965». 
6. Id. (citing Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612-15 (1973». 
7. 312 U.S. 496 (1941). 
8. When a federal court abstains, it is avoiding answering a constitutional question 
prematurely since an interpretation of the state statute could obviate the need to resolve the 
constitutional question. "The reign of law is hardly promoted if an unnecessary ruling of a 
federal court is thus supplanted by a controlling decision of the state court." Id. at 500. 
Thus, Pullman abstention is an equitable power which allows federal courts to further the 
harmonious relations between state and federal authority. Id. at 501. 
9. Id. 
10. Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 148 (1976); Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167, 
177 (1959); Pullman, 312 U.S. at 498. 
11. Abstention forces litigants to initiate a state court proceeding on the state law 
issues, which obviously delays final adjudication and increases the expense to the litigants. 
See infra notes 30-33 and accompanying text for further discussion of the burdens absten­
tion imposes upon litigants. 
12. Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 489-90 (1965); Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 
241, 252 (1967) (observing that the delay of state court proceedings might itself effect the 
impermissible chilling of the constitutional right sought to be protected); see also Note, 
Pullman Abstention: Reconsidering the Boundaries, 59 TEMP. L.Q. 1243, 1248-49 (1986). 
13. Pullman, 312 U.S. at 501. 
14. Bellotti, 428 U.S. at 148; see also City of Houstonv. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 473 
(1987) (powell, J., dissenting) ("Constitutional analysis should not proceed until we deter­
mine the precise meaning of the ordinance in question."). 
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subset of the abstention doctrine which arises under state law. A fed­
eral court may choose to make use of a state certification statute or 
rule in order to obtain an authoritative answer to a state law question 
before the court proceeds to the merits of the constitutional question. I S 
Thus, certification furthers the interests of federalism by providing a 
state court with the opportunity to decide an issue of state law before 
being precluded from doing so by a contrary federal court decision. 16 
Because the state law question goes directly to the highest court of the 
state, certification is less costly to litigants than abstention~ 17 Conse­
quently, certification presents the best way to accommodate a reason­
able balance between principles of federalism and the expeditious relief 
required when constitutionally protected rights are potentially at 
stake. IS 
Two problems, however, prevent successful use of certification 
procedures in the first amendment overbreadth situation. First, the 
test for certification - whether a statute is readily susceptible to a 
narrowing construction which would render an otherwise unconstitu­
tional statute constitutionall9 - invites a federal court to make a sub­
15. Dorman v. Satti, 862 F.2d 432, 434 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 2450 
(1989). See generally 17A C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE 
AND PROCEDURE § 4248 (1988 & Supp. 1989). Thirty-eight states have adopted proce­
dures that allow federal courts to certify questions of state law to the highest court of the 
state. Id. at 167 n.30; Committee on Federal Courts, Analysis ofState Laws Providing for 
Certification by Federal Courts of Determinative State Issues ofLaw, 42 REc. A. B. CITY 
N.Y. 101 app. at 126-54 (1987). 
16. Dorman, 862 F.2d at 435. Unlike the availability of Supreme Court review when 
state courts decide federal issues, there is no possibility of direct review within the state 
judiciary when federal courts decide questions of state law. Field, Abstention in Constitu­
tional Cases: The Scope ofthe Pullman Abstention Doctrine, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 1071, 1085 
(1974). Once a federal court invalidates a state law based upon an erroneous reading of the 
state law, a state can only correct the federal decision through legislative enactment or by 
initiating judicial proceedings in state court. Since there is no direct review from a federal 
court to a state court, any new state proceeding requires a new case or controversy. Id. at 
1119 n.I40; see also Wilkins, Certification of Questions ofLaw: The Massachusetts Experi­
ence, 74 MASS. L. REV..256,257 n.18 (1989). 
17. Field, The Abstention Doctrine Today, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 590, 606 (1977). Pro­
fessor Field argues that abstention is not worth the costs it imposes on litigants and that if 
state court input is necessary for unsettled issues of state law, certification is vastly superior 
to abstention. Id. at 605. Professor Field also argues that the benefits of certification are 
greater than abstention because the unclear state issue is presented directly to the state 
supreme court. Under abstention, there is no guarantee that the state law issue will make 
its way through the state judiciary to the state's highest court. Id. at 606-07. 
18. "[C]ourts usually perceive certification as a better means of achieving the end for 
which abstention was fashioned." Corr & Robbins, Interjurisdictional Certification and 
Choice ofLaw, 41 VAND. L. REv. 411, 417 (1988); see also Committee on Federal Courts, 
supra note 15, at 102 (observing that if the issue is posed as one between abstention and 
certification, certification usually provides a more expeditious resolution). 
19. Dorman, 862 F.2d at 435. 
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jective judgment it should not make. The test for certification asks a 
federal court to determine whether a state statute is susceptible to a 
limiting construction and, thus, fails to serve the federalism interests 
upon which certification rests since it invites a federal court to decide 
the merits of the state law issue.2o Certification is designed to provide 
the opportunity for state court input before a federal court proceeds to 
the merits.21 A standard that encourages federal determination ofthe 
state law question leads to the opposite result. 
The second problem with the test for certification is that it is un­
workable. In answering the question of whether a statute is readily 
susceptible to a narrow construction, federal courts attempt to distin­
guish between a narrowing construction and a rewriting of the stat­
ute.22 This distinction is illusive. Courts have disagreed and will 
continue to disagree over the clarity of statutes.23 Yet, the clarity of a 
statute is of critical importance because a first amendment overbreadth 
analysis always requires construction of the statute in question24 and 
because a federal court should only certify when the state law issue is 
unclear.2s 
The recent case of Dorman v. Satti 26 illustrates the problems with 
application of the certification standard. The fundamental disagree­
ment between the majority opinion and the dissent shows the difficulty 
in applying the "readily susceptible" test for certification.27 Further­
more, the decision not to certify demonstrates how easily a federal 
court can frustrate state legislative policy despite supposed federal 
court respect for state independence.28 
This Note will examine the current application of the test for cer­
tification in the context of a first amendment overbreadth challenge, 
20. See infra notes 122-29 and accompanying text for a discussion of how a federal 
court must address the merits of the state law question to decide whether to certify. 
21. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
22. See infra notes 130-43 and accompanying text for a discussion of the distinction 
between narrowly construing and rewriting a statute. 
23. See infra note 138 and accompanying text for a discussion of how courts have 
determined when a statute is sufficiently unclear to warrant abstention or certification. See 
also infra note 144 and accompanying text. 
24. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 618 n.16 (1973). 
25. Kidney v. Kolmar Laboratories, 808 F.2d 955, 957 (2d Cir. 1987) ("[C)er­
tification procedure is a valuable device for securing prompt and authoritative resolution of 
unsettled questions of state law."). 
26. 862 F.2d 432 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 2450 (1989). 
27. See infra notes 79-117 and accompanying text for the facts and reasoning in 
Dorman. 
28. See infra notes 88-107 and accompanying text for an analysis of the majority's 
decision not to certify the state law questions in Dorman. 
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focusing on the reasoning in Dorman. Section I traces the develop­
ment of certification and its intended purpose in federal practice. This 
section also examines the relationship between certification and facial 
invalidation of state statutes. Section II discusses the reasoning in 
Dorman. Section III analyzes the Dorman decision in light of the in­
tended purpose of certification. Given these purposes, Section III pro­
poses that federal courts certify before they invalidate an unconstrued 
state statute. Section III also contains a proposal that federal courts 
grant interim relief during the certification process to alleviate any 
possible chilling of constitutionally protected rights. 
I. BACKGROUND: DEVELOPMENT OF CERTIFICATION 
A. From Abstention to Certification 
Certification is largely an outgrowth of Pullman abstention.29 
Under the Pullman doctrine, a federal court directs the plaintiff to 
begin a state court action on the state law question, usually in the form 
of a declaratory judgment action.30 Thus, the parties must undergo 
two lawsuits instead of one in order to allow federal and state courts 
the opportunity to rule on their own law.31 The parties may then 
choose to litigate both the federal and state claims in state court or to 
litigate only the state issue, reserving the right to return to federal 
court on the constitutional issue if the plaintiff loses in state court.32 
The additional delay and expense to litigants in maintaining two law­
suits is enormous. 33 
In contrast to the burdensome abstention doctrine, state certifica­
tion statutes provide federal courts with an avenue for posing unclear 
questions of state law directly to the state's highest court.34 The fed­
29. Corr & Robbins, supra note 18, at 416. 
30. Committee on Federal Courts of the New York State Bar Association, Report on 
the Abstention Doctrine: The Consequences ofFederal Court Deference to State Court Pr0­
ceedings, 122 F.R.D. 89, 94 (1988). 
31. Corr & Robbins, supra note 18, at 416; see also Field, supra note 17. 
32. Field, supra note 17, at 591 (citing England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical 
Examiners, 375 U.S. 411 (1964»; see also 122 F.R.D. at 94 (also citing England). 
33. The Committee on Federal Courts, Subcommittee on Abstention, concluded that 
expansion of abstention will have the practical effect of frustrating or unduly delaying the 
adjudication of federal claims. 122 F.R.D. at 106-07; see also Corr & Robbins, supra note 
18, at 416 ("[A]bstention imposes duplicative litigation on federal and state trial courts and 
also imposes a tax on the public treasury."); Field, supra note 17, at 591·92. Abstention 
may deter litigants from seeking a federal forum in the first place or it may induce them to 
minimize their costs by presenting all issues to the state court, thereby waiving their right 
to return to federal court on the federal issues. Professor Field concludes that abstention is 
not worth these costs. ld. 
34. See supra note 15. In 1945, Florida became the first state to enact an inteIjuris· 
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eral court will rule on the merits of the federal question after it re­
ceives the state supreme court's answer(s) to the certified question(s). 
Unlike abstention, certification bypasses the trial and appellate levels 
of state litigation to produce a more expeditious resolution of the state 
law issue. 35 Also, in contrast to abstention, certification guarantees 
that the state's highest court will have the opportunity to decide the 
state law issue.36 Thus, certification respects state autonomy, while 
relieving litigants of some of the burdens imposed by abstention.37 
Despite its advantages over abstention, certification did not play 
an important role in the federal courts until recently.38 By 1974, only 
a handful of states had adopted certification procedures since Florida's 
was enacted in 1945.39 Without a state certification procedure, a fed­
eral court cannot compel a state court to answer questions concerning 
state law issues. Several more states, however, enacted certification 
statutes and/or rules following the Supreme Court's successful use of 
these state procedures in the 1970s. 
B. The Supreme Court View of Certification 
In 1974, the Supreme Court recognized the advantages of certifi­
cation over abstention in Lehman Bros. v. Schein,4() observing that cer­
tification saves "time, energy, and resources and helps build a 
cooperative judicial federalism."41 Two years after Lehman Bros., the 
Supreme Court again noted the benefits of certification. 
In Bellotti v. Baird,42 the Court vacated and remanded a district 
court decision to enjoin the operation of a Massachusetts abortion 
dictional certification statute. See Roth, Certified Questions from the Federal Courts: Re­
view and Re"Proposal, 34 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1, 3 (1979). Enactment of the Florida 
certification statute followed closely after the Supreme Court's decision in Meredith v. 
Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228 (1943), which allowed a federal court to decide a purely state 
law issue concerning the redemption of municipal bonds. The Meredith case was arguably 
a reaction against the use of abstention by the federal courts to avoid decisions on difficult 
state issues. Thus, the Florida certification statute was designed to be consistent with the 
theory behind the abstention doctrine and yet not violate the Meredith principle that the 
mere difficulty of ascertaining local law in a diversity suit is insufficient to order abstention. 
Roth, supra, at 6-7. 
35. Comment, Abstention and Certification in Diversity Suits: "Perfection ofMeans 
and Confusion of Goals", 73 YALE L.J. 850, 866-69 (1964). 
36. See supra note 17. 
37. Corr & Robbins, supra note 18, at 417. 
38. 17A C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 15, at 162-63. 
39. Id. at 163. 
40. 416 U.S. 386 (1974). 
41. Id. at 391. 
42. 428 U.S. 132 (1976). 
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consent statute.43 The Court found that the district court should have 
certified questions concerning the meaning of the statute and the pro­
cedures it imposed to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.44 
The Bellotti Court stated: 
It is sufficient that the statute is susceptible of the interpretation 
offered by appellants . . . and that such an interpretation would 
avoid or substantially modify the federal constitutional challenge to 
the statute, as it clearly would. Indeed, in the absence of an author-" 
itative construction, it is impossible to define precisely the constitu­
. tional question presented.4S 
The Court further noted that although abstention would be proper in 
this case were certification unavailable, "the availability of certification 
greatly simplifies the analysis."46 
The most recent Supreme Court case to invoke a state certifica­
tion procedure was Virginia v. American Booksellers Association.47 A 
1985 amendment to the Virginia statutes made it unlawful "to know­
ingly display for commercial purpose in a manner whereby juveniles 
may examine and peruse" sexually explicit visual or written material 
which is "harmful to juveniles."48 The previously existing statute only 
43. Id. at 133-34. The statute provided in part: 

[When Ii woman seeks an abortion, if she] is less than eighteen years of age and 

has not married, the consent of both the mother and her parents is required. If 

one or both of the mother's parents refuse such consent, consent [for the abortion] 

may be obtained by order of a judge of the superior court for good cause shown, 

after such hearing as he deems necessary. 

Id. at 134-35 (quoting MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 12P (West 1974) (current ver­
sion at MASS. GEN. L. ch. 112, § 12S (1990»). 
44. Id. at 151. At the district court level, a divided three judge panel held that ins0­
far as the Massachusetts statute created a parental veto over a minor's decision to obtain an 
abortion, the statute violated the fourteenth amendment. Baird v. Bellotti, 393 F. Supp. 
847, 855-56 (D. Mass. 1975), vacated, 428 U.S. 132 (1976). The dissenting judge argued 
that because the Massachusetts statute expressly provided that the parents' refusal to con­
sent was not final, state courts could make the final determination. Therefore, the dissent 
reasoned, if the state court found that a minor was mature enough to give an informed 
consent, the court would enter the necessary order permitting her to exercise her constitu­
tional right to an abortion despite the fact that her parents had refused their consent. Id. at 
864. 
45. Bellotti, 428 U.S. at 148. 
46. Id. at 151. The Massachusetts certification procedure is available through Mass. 
Sup. Jud. Ct. R. 1:03, 382 Mass. 700 (1981) (formerly Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct. R. 3:21, 359 
Mass. 790 (1971». See Wilkins, Certification ofQuestions ofLaw: The Massachusetts Ex­
perience, 74 MASS. L. REV. 256, 256 nn.I-2 (1989). 
47. 484 U.S. 383 (1988). 
48. Id. at 386 (quoting VA. CoDE § 18.2-391(a) (Supp. 1987»; see also Note, When 
Concepts Collide: Display Provisions and the First Amendment, 10 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 
133 (1988) (discussing American Booksellers Ass'n). 
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prohibited the sale of such materials to juveniles.49 
The American Booksellers Association brought suit challenging 
the amendment's constitutionality. The Association argued that the 
amendment restricted access to adults because of the economically 
bUrdensome and restrictive measures booksellers would have to adopt 
to comply with the statute. 50 The Association also argued that the 
amendment was unconstitutionally overbroad because it restricted ac­
cess by mature juveniles to works that were harmful only to younger 
juveniles.51 Finally, the plaintiffs argued that the amendment was un­
constitutionally vague because it would be impossible to determine 
what standard to use in deciding whether a particular work was suita­
ble for juveniles of ditfering ages and maturity levels. 52 
The Virginia Attorney General argued that the 1985 amendment 
extended only to "borderline obscenity" and that booksellers could 
comply with the statute by tagging the restricted materials or by plac­
ing them behind "blinder racks."s3 Thus, the Attorney General ar­
gued that the statute had no "significant 'spillover' effect on adults. "54 
Declining to abstain,55 the federal district court held that the stat­
ute was unconstitutionally overbroad and permanently enjoined its en­
forcement.56 The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed.57 
The state appealed, alleging a conflict among the courts of appeals 
since the Eighth and Tenth Circuits had upheld similar statutes. S8 
The Supreme Court in American Booksellers Association held that 
it should not attempt to decide the constitutional issues without first 
having the Virginia Supreme Court's interpretation of the statute and, 
therefore, it certified two questions. 59 The. Court based its decision to 
49. American Booksellers Ass'n, 484 U.S. at 386-87. 
50. Id. at 388-89. Specifically, the booksellers argued that compliance would require 
a bookseller to create an "adults only" section of the store, place the covered works behind 
the counter, decline to carry the materials in question or bar juveniles from the store. Id. at 
389. 
51. Id. 
52. Id. at 389-90. 
53. Id. at 390. Blinder racks hold magazines and books and display only the title of 
the work. 
54. Id. 
55. Virginia's certification procedure was not available to the lower courts since it 
only became effective on April 1, 1987. Id. at 386. 
56. Id. at 391. The district court adopted the plaintiff's theory as to the scope of the 
statute and rejected the Attorney General's suggestion for compliance. Id. 
57. Id. 
58. Id. at 392 (citing Upper Midwest Booksellers Ass'n v. City of Minneapolis, 780 
F.2d 1389 (8th Cir. 1985); M.S. News Co. v. Casado, 721 F.2d 1281 (10th Cir. 1983»; see 
also Note, supra note 48. 
59. American Booksellers Ass'n, 484 U.S. at 393. The Supreme Court certified two 
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certify on the unusual supposition that the state would decline to de­
fend the statute if its scope were as broad as the booksellers asserted. 60 
Furthermore, since the statute would remain enjoined during the certi­
fication process, the Court reasoned that "[i]n these circumstances, 
there is some advantage and no cost, either in terms of the first amend­
ment chilling effect or unnecessary delay, to certifying a proffered nar­
rowing construction that is neither inevitable nor impossible."61 
The Court proceeded to say that in considering a facial challenge 
to a statute, a federal court should uphold the statute if it is "readily 
susceptible" to a narrowing construction that would render it constitu­
tional.62 The unusual circumstances in American Booksellers Associa­
tion,63 however, prevented the Court from having to determine 
whether the Virginia statute was readily susceptible to a narrowing 
construction because the Court chose to certify on the basis that there 
was nothing to risk and much to gain.64 . 
This "readily susceptible" test for determining the facial validity 
of a statute derived from the first amendment overbreadth doctrine.6s 
Recently, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit cited American 
Booksellers Association and other overbreadth cases as support for the 
proposition that the test for certification is whether a statute is readily 
susceptible to a narrowing construction.66 Consequently, it appears as 
questions to the Virginia Supreme Court. First, the Court asked if the phrase "harmful to 
juveniles" encompassed any of the plaintiff's exhibits, and what general standard should be 
used to determine the statute's reach in light of differing ages and maturity levels of 
juveniles. Second, the Court asked whether a bookseller could comply with the statute by 
prohibiting juveniles from examining harmful materials when observed, but otherwise tak­
ing no action. If compliance was not met, the Court then asked whether booksellers could 
comply with the statute by announcing the store's policy to the public. Id. at 398. 
60. Id. at 394-95. 
61. Id. at 397. 
62. Id. (citing Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975); Broadrick v. 
Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973». 
63. See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text. 
64. American Booksellers Ass'n, 484 U.S. at 397. 
The Virginia Supreme Court answered the first certified question in the negative. The 
result was that none of the plaintiff's exhibits were "harmful to juveniles" under the stat­
ute. The court answered the second certified question in the affirmative. Thus, a bookseller 
could comply with the statute by prohibiting juveniles from perusing the harmful materials 
when observed without taking additional action. Commonwealth v. American Booksellers 
Ass'n, 236 Va. 168, 372 S.E.ld 618 (1988). 
Upon receiving these answers to the certified questions, the Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's holding that the amendment to the statute was 
unconstitutionally overbroad. American Booksellers Ass'n v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 
882 F.2d 125 (4th Cir. 1989). 
65. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 (1973). See infra notes 67-78 for a 
discussion of the relationship between the overbreadth doctrine and certification. 
66. Dorman v. Satti, 862 F.2d 432,435 (ld Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 2450 
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if some federal judges consider the tests for certification and facial in­
validation due to overbreadth to be the same. 
C. The Overbreadth Doctrine and Certification 
A first amendment overbreadth challenge in federal court is one 
example of a situation where a federal court may be asked to review 
the constitutionality of a state statute before that statute has been con­
strued by a state court. Under the first amendment overbreadth doc­
trine, a federal court may invalidate an allegedly overbroad statute on 
its face. That is, a federal court may forbid enforcement of the statute 
so as to remove the threat or deterrence to protected expression.67 
The Supreme Court labelled the use of the overbreadth doctrine 
"strong medicine"68 and recognized that "[i]t remains a 'matter of no 
little difficulty' to determine when a law may be properly held void on 
its face and when 'such summary action' is inappropriate."69 
A federal court must balance the possible deterrence of protected 
activity with a state's right to regulate conduct that is "within its 
power to proscribe. "70 The Supreme Court uses a two part test to 
determine whether a statute is unconstitutionally overbroad. First, "a 
law should not be invalidated . . . unless it reaches a substantial 
number of impermissible applications."71 Second, the court should 
(1989) (citing American Booksellers Ass'n, 484 U.S. at 397; Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 
148 (1976); Ermoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 216 (1975); Broadrick v. 
Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 (1973». 
67. Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 613; see also New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 768 
(1982). In Ferber, the Court explained that "[t]he [overbreadth] doctrine is predicated on 
the sensitive nature of protected expression: 'persons whose expression is constitutionally 
protected may well refrain from exercising their rights for fear of criminal sanctions by a 
statute susceptible of application to protected expression.''' Id. (citing Village of 
Schaumberg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620, 634 (1980); Gooding v. 
Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 521 (1972». For a detailed discussion of the overbreadth doctrine, 
see generally Monaghan, Overbreadth, 1981 SUP. Cr. REV. 1; Redish, The Warren Court. 
the Burger Court and the First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 78 Nw. U.L. REv. 1031 
(1983). 
68. Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 613. 
69. Id. at 615 (quoting Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 617 (1971) (opin­
ion of Black, J.». 
70. Id. (citing Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174-75 (1969»; see also 
supra notes 2-6 and accompanying text. 
71. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 771; see also Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 615, where the Court 
explained: 
Although . . . laws, if too broadly worded, may deter protected speech to some 
unknown extent, there comes a point where that effect-at best a prediction­
cannot, with confidence, justify invalidating a statute on its face and so prohibit­
ing a State from enforcing the statute against conduct that is admittedly within its 
power to proscribe. 
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not invalidate a statute if it is readily susceptible to a limiting con­
struction which removes the threat or deterrence to protected 
expression.72 
The obvious relationship between certification and overbreadth is 
that to determine whether a statute violates constitutional standards 
because it is substantially overbroad, a court must first determine what 
that statute means.73 Certification, as a method of ascertaining an au­
thoritative interpretation of state law, may avoid or substantially mod­
ify the constitutional challenge to the statute.74 An overbreadth 
challenge to an unconstrued state statute presents a peculiar problem 
because the tests for certification and overbreadth are almost identical 
since both tests require a determination of whether the statute is sub­
ject to a narrowing construction. If a federal court does not certify 
questions concerning the meaning of the unconstrued state statute, it 
risks invalidating a state statute based upon an erroneous interpreta­
tion of state law. If, however, a federal court considers certification, it 
risks determining the merits of the state law issue in. its attempt to 
determine whether it should certify that issue to the state court.7S 
This is because the test for certification - whether a statute is readily 
susceptible to a narrowing construction - is the same as part two of 
the test for overbreadth. 
Virginia v. American Booksellers Association 76 and Bellotti v. 
Baird 77 show the logic of first defining the constitutional issue with an 
authoritative construction of the statute before proceeding to the mer­
its of the federal constitutional question. Recently, in Dorman v. 
Satti,78 the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit failed to appreci­
ate this logic and arguably determined the scope of the state statute in 
an attempt to determine whether it should certify that issue to the 
Connecticut Supreme Court. 
Id. 
72. Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 613. 
73. An overbreadth analysis necessarily requires construction of the statute in ques· 
tion in order to assess its scope. See Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 508­
09 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring); see also Virginia v. American Booksellers Ass'n, 484 
U.S. 383, 399 (1988) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (Justice Ste­
vens, in dissenting from the Court's refusal to modify a certified question, stated "an an­
swer to the question I would ask would be of great help in understanding the reach of the 
statute and evaluating its validity."). 
74. American Booksellers Ass'n, 484 U.S. at 396. 
75. See infra notes 122-29 and accompanying text. 
76. 484 U.S. 383 (1988). 
77. 428 U.S. 132 (1976). 
78. 862 F.2d 432·(2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 2450 (1989). 
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II. DORMAN V. SAITI 79 
A. The Facts 
In 1985, the Connecticut legislature enacted a statute which pro­
hibited interference with the lawful taking of wildlife (the "Hunter 
statute").80 The statute also prohibited the harassment of a person 
engaged in or in the preparation of lawful hunting.81 Violation of the 
Act was a class C misdemeanor, which could lead "to a fine and/or 
imprisonment for up to three months. "82 
Francelle Dorman was arrested under the Act when she ap­
proached several hunters and attempted to dissuade them from their 
plans to hunt geese.83 Although the chief prosecutor dismissed the 
charges against Dorman, she filed suit in federal district court, seeking 
a declaratory judgment as to the validity of the statute.84 She alleged 
that her actual arrest and the threat of future enforcement of the Act 
violated her first and fourteenth amendment rights. 8s 
B. The District Court Decision 
On cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court inval­
idated the Connecticut statute on the ground that since the Act failed 
to define what conduct constituted interference or harassment, the 
statute's language was impermissibly vague and overbroad.86 Simi­
larly, the court found that the statute was unconstitutionally over­
broad because it failed to limit, as to time and place, "acts in 
preparation" of lawful hunting. 87 
C. The Court ofAppeals Decision 
1. The Majority 
On appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, the 
Chief Prosecutor argued that construction of the terms "interfere," 
"harass," and "acts in preparation" should be certified to the Connect­
79. Id. 
80. Id. at 433 (citing CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-183a (1985». 
81. Id. 
82. Id. 
83. Id. at 434. 
84. Id. The state prosecutor dismissed the charges, conceding that Dorman's arrest 
was premature since she only talked about what she was going to do to interfere with the 
hunting of the geese. Id. 
85. Id. 
86. Dorman v. Satti, 678 F. Supp. 375, 383-84 (D. Conn.), aff'd, 862 F.2d 432 (2d 
Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 2450 (1989). 
87. Id. at 382. 
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icut Supreme Court because that court had not had the opportunity to 
construe the statutory language.88 The Chief Prosecutor also appealed 
on the merits. 89 
The court of appeals in Dorman declined to invoke Connecticut's 
certification procedure90 and affirmed the district court's decision to 
invalidate the Connecticut statute.91 The Second Circuit acknowl­
edged that the Supreme Court encouraged the use of state certification 
procedures as an alternative to abstention,92 and recognized that certi­
fication may further the interests of federaVstate comity.93 Neverthe­
less, the Second Circuit said that "issues of state law 'are not to be 
88. Dorman v. Satti, 862 F.2d 432, 434-45 (2d Cir. 1988), cerL denied, 109 S. Ct. 
2450 (1989). 
89. Id. at 434. 
90. Connecticut's certification statute reads: 
(a) This section may be cited as the Uniform Certification of Questions of 
Law Act. 
(b) The supreme court may answer questions of law certified to it by the 
Supreme Court of the United States, a court of appeals of the United States or a 
United States district court when requested by the certifying court if there are 
involved in any proceeding before it questions of law of this state which may be 
determinative of the cause then pending in the certifying court and as to which it 
appears to the certifying court there is no controlling precedent in the decisions of 
the supreme court of this state. 
(c) This section may be invoked by an order of any of the courts referred to 
in subsection (b) of this section upon the court's own motion or upon the motion 
of any party to the cause. 
(d) A certification order shall set forth: (1) The questions of law to be an­
swered; and (2) a statement of all facts relevant to the questions certified and 
showing fully the nature of the controversy in which the questions arose. 
(e) The certification order shall be prepared by the certifying court, signed 
by the judge presiding at the hearing, and forwarded to the supreme court by the 
clerk of the certifying court under its official seal. The supreme court may require 
the original or copies of all or of any portion of the record before the certifying 
court to be filed with the certification order, if, in the opinion of the supreme 
court, the record or portion thereof may be necessary in answering the questions. 
(f) Fees and costs shall be the same as in civil appeals docketed before the 
supreme court and shall be equally divided between the parties unless otherwise 
ordered by the certifying court in its order of certification. 
(g) Proceedings in the supreme court shall be those provided in the rules of 
said court. 
(h) The written opinion of the supreme court stating the law governing the 
questions certified shall be sent by the clerk under the seal of the supreme court to 
the certifying court and to the parties. 
(i) This section shall be so construed as to effectuate its general purpose to 
make uniform the law of those states which enact it. 
CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 51-199a (1989). 
91. Dorman, 862 F.2d at 437. 
92. Id. at 434 (citing Virginia v. American Booksellers Ass'n, 484 U.S. 383, 396 
(1988». 
93. Id. at 434-35. 
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routinely certified ... simply because a certification procedure is avail­
able. The procedure must not be a device for shifting the burdens of 
this Court to those whose burdens are at least as great.' "94 
According to the Second Circuit, the test for determining the ne­
cessity of certification is whether the statute in question is readily sus­
ceptible to a narrowing construction that would render it 
constitutional.9S In determining that the Connecticut statute was not 
readily susceptible to a narrowing construction, the court of appeals 
distinguished Dorman from State v. Williams,96 in which the Connect­
icut Supreme Court upheld a similar statute. 
In Williams, the Connecticut Supreme Court upheld a state law 
making it a crime to interfere with police officers or firefighters in the 
performance of their duties.97 That statute defines interference as ob­
structing, resisting, hindering or endangering a police officer or 
firefighter "in the performance of his duties."98 The Connecticut 
Supreme Court upheld the statute by limiting its application to inten­
tional interference. 99 
. Both the Second Circuit in Dorman and the Connecticut 
Supreme Court distinguished the statute in Williams from a similar 
ordinance which the United States Supreme Court struck down in 
City ofHouston v. HiII.loo The ordinance in Hill declared it "unlawful 
for any person to ... in any manner oppose, molest, abuse or interrupt 
any policeman in the execution of his duty."101 The United States 
Supreme Court held that the Houston ordinance was unambiguous 
and not easily susceptible to a limiting construction because it was not 
drawn so narrowly as to prohibit only disorderly conduct or fighting 
words, which may be constitutionally proscribed.102 In declining to 
94. Id. at 435 (quoting Kidney v. Kolmar Laboratories, 808 F.2d 955, 957 (2d Cir. 
1987». 
95. Id. (citing Virginia v. American Booksellers Ass'n, 484 U.S. 383, 397 (1988». 
96. 205 Conn. 456, 534 A.2d 230 (1987). 
97. Id. at 467, 534 A.2d at 236 (citing CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-167a (1971». 
98. Id. 
99. Id. at 474, 534 A.2d at 239. The court explained that the definition of "interfer­
ing" had been construed to include only intentional conduct: 
By its terms, § 53a-167a is directed only at conduct that interferes with police and 
firemen in the performance of their duties. As we have said earlier, it encom­
passes only interference that is intentional. This limiting construction, which we 
deem to be fully consistent with the intent of the legislature, preserves the stat­
ute's purpose to proscribe "core criminal conduct" that is not constitutionally 
protected. 
Id. at 473-74, 534 A.2d at 239 (citation and footnote omitted). 
100. 482 U.S. 451 (1987). 
101. Id. at 461. 
102. Id. at 462, 465. The Court noted that the language would "prohibit[] verbal 
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certify because the statute was not readily susceptible to a narrowing 
construction, the Hill Court noted that "[a] federal court may not 
properly ask a state court if it would care in effect to rewrite a 
statute."103 
Comparing the Connecticut Hunter statute to the statutes in Wi/­
liams and Hill, the Second Circuit likened the Hunter statute to the 
ordinance in Hill. The court of appeals said that "because the [Con­
necticut Hunter] Act fails to define the nature of the interference it 
proscribes, its language implicitly sweeps as broadly as that of the 
Houston ordinance, and it thus cannot be saved by a limiting construc­
tion as was Section 53a-167a" in WiIliams. 104 
Consequently, the Dorman court held that although the parties 
offered conflicting interpretations of the Connecticut statute, "the 
Connecticut court would be in no better position than a federal court 
to decide which interpretation is correct. This is because ... the stat­
ute ... is so imprecise and indefinite that it is subject to any number of 
interpretations."lOs To ask the Connecticut Supreme Court to con­
sider construing the statute more narrowly, such as applying only to 
"core criminal conduct," would, according to the court of appeals, "be 
tantamount to asking the Connecticut court 'if it would care in effect 
to rewrite [the] statute.' "106 
With this observation, the Second Circuit in Dorman illustrated 
the second major problem with the "readily susceptible" test. Federal 
courts often say that a particular statute is not subject to a narrowing 
construction because to construe the language more narrowly would 
result in a rewriting of the statute.107 How to tell the difference be­
tween narrowly construing and rewriting a statute remains a mystery. 
interruptions of police officers." Id. at 461. But see id. at 473-75 (powell, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part) (arguing that the ordinance was ambiguous enough to warrant 
certification). 
103. Id. at 471; see infra notes 132-37 and accompanying text. But see Williams, 205 
Conn. at 473, 534 A.2d at 239 (Unlike the United States Supreme Court, a state supreme 
court has the power to construe state statutes narrowly to comport with constitutional 
standards.). 
104. Dorman v. Satti, 862 F.2d 432, 435 (quoting Dorman v. Satti, 678 F. Supp. 375, 
381-82 (D. Conn. 1988», cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 2450 (1989). 
105. Id. at 436. The court of appeals, however, overlooked the fact that a state court 
construction of state law is, though perhaps incorrect, the authoritative interpretation. 
Furthermore, the purpose of certification is to allow a state court to provide an authorita­
tive interpretation. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
106. Dorman, 862 F.2d at 436 (quoting City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 471 
(1987». 
107. See Virginia v. American Booksellers Ass'n, 484 U.S. 383, 397 (1988); City of 
Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 471 (1987); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 
216 n.15 (1975); Dorman, 862 F.2d at 436. 
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Moreover, the dissenting opinion in Dorman did not agree with the 
majority's interpretation of the statute's scope. 
2. The Dissent 
Judge Miner filed a dissenting opinion in Dorman, in which he 
argued in favor of certification. Judge Miner thought that the statu­
tory terms "interfere," "harass," and "acts in preparation" were sus­
ceptible to a limiting state court construction. lOS • 
First, unlike the majority, Judge Miner was unable to distinguish 
the Connecticut statute from that in Wil/iams. 109 According to Judge 
Miner, hunting activities could be substituted for police duties so that 
the Hunter statute would confine proscribed conduct to meddling or 
hampering in hunting activities. llo Second, Connecticut law affords a 
restrictive definition of "harassment" in its telephone harassment stat­
ute, which requires evidence of an intention to annoy or alarm another 
person. II I Thus, Judge Miner argued that there is no reason why the 
Connecticut Supreme Court could not d~fine harassment in the con­
text of the Hunter statute without impinging on the first amend­
ment. 1I2 Third, Judge Miner argued that a narrowing construction 
could limit "acts in preparation" to preparatory acts "directly, un­
equivocally and immediately related to the act of taking wildlife." I \3 
In addition, Judge Miner concluded that the Connecticut sever­
ability statute,114 which allows the Connecticut Supreme Court to ex­
cise invalid portions of state statutes without affecting the valid 
remainder, shows that the Hunter statute is "subject to pruning by the 
Connecticut Supreme Court."IIS 
Finally, in apparent recognition of the difficulty inherent in ap­
plying the readily susceptible test, Judge Miner compared the Con­
necticut Hunter statute to the statute in Virginia v. American 
Booksellers Association 116 and concluded: 
If the term "harmful to juveniles," as defined in a Virginia statute 
prohibiting the display of certain visual or written materials, is con­
sidered subject to a narrowing construction by the Virginia Supreme 
108. See Dorman, 862 F.2d at 438 (Miner, J., dissenting). 
109. Id. See supra notes 96-104 and accompanying text for a discussion of Williams. 
110. Dorman, 862 F.2d at 438 (Miner, J., dissenting). 





114. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1-3 (1989). 
115. Dorman, 862 F.2d at 438 (Miner, J., dissenting). 
116. 484 U.S. 383 (1988). 
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Court after certification, then the objectionable terms in the Con­
necticut Hunter Harassment Act certainly should be capable of the 
sort of limiting construction that would meet constitutional 
challenges. 1 17 
The fundamental disagreement over the susceptibility of the Con­
necticut Hunter statute to a saving construction shows the weakness of 
the "readily susceptible" test for certification. The "readily suscepti­
ble" standard invites disagreement because it is unclear how to tell 
when, or if, a narrowing construction becomes a rewriting of the stat­
ute. More importantly, the result in Dorman also demonstrates how 
easy it is for a federal court to invalidate an unconstrued state law. 
III. ANALYSIS 
Federal courts invoke certification procedures to redress the diffi­
culties of abstention. 1 IS Certification shares with abstention the objec­
tives of avoiding unnecessary constitutional adjudication and 
preventing unnecessary interference with state policy.l19 The issue for 
federal courts is to determine the necessity of federal court interfer­
ence with state legislative policy. In other words, should a federal 
court certify first or should it invalidate the unconstrued state law on 
its face? The Dorman decision shows how easy it is for a federal court 
to pay only lip service to important federalism interests and still invali­
date an unconstrued state law po 
The Second Circuit's application of the "readily susceptible" test 
in Dorman illustrates the two problems with the standard. First, the 
test encourages federal courts to rule on the merits of the constitu­
tional validity of a state statute, thereby failing to serve the federal 
interest of deference to state court interpretation of state law. Second, 
when determining whether a state statute is readily susceptible to a 
limiting construction, federal courts attempt to distinguish between 
narrowly construing and rewriting the statute. This distinction is diffi­
cult, if not impossible to make. 
Application of the "readily susceptible" standard fails to serve the 
117. Dorman, 862 F.2d at 438 (Miner, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
118. Corr & Robbins, supra note 18, at 417. See supra notes 29-39 and accompany­
ing text for a discussion of the development of certification. 
119. Corr & Robbins, supra note 18, at 417 n.27 (citing Note, Interjurisdictional 
Cenification: Beyond Abstention Toward Cooperative Judicial Federalism, III U. PA. L. 
REv. 344,350 (1963); see also Field, supra note 17, at 590. 
120. Before invalidating the Connecticut Hunter statute, the Second Circuit restated 
the federalism interests that certification is designed to further. See supra notes 92-94 and 
accompanying text. 
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federalism interests upon which certification rests because federal 
courts, rather than state courts, determine the susceptibility of state 
law to a state court's narrowing construction. Thus, despite the avail­
ability of a means for ascertaining an authoritative interpretation of 
state law, federal courts routinely are able to invalidate unconstrued 
state statutes. This threat to federalism should be cause for concern as 
federal court litigation of state issues increases. 121 
A. 	 The "Readily Susceptible" Test Encourages a Decision on the 
Merits 
. The "readily susceptible" test for certification invites a federal 
court to predict whether a state court could narrowly construe a state 
statute to save it from constitutional attack. In making such a predic­
tion, a federal court must anticipate somewhat the merits of the consti­
tutional question. 122 
The Second Circuit's analysis in Dorman illustrates that its deci­
sion not to certify the meaning of the key terms in the Hunter statute 
was a function of its determination that the language was unconstitu­
tionally overbroad. In Section II of the court's opinion, entitled "The 
Merits," the court stated that when considering a facial challenge to 
an allegedly vague and overbroad statute, "a court's first task is to 
determine whether the enactment reaches a substantial amount of con­
stitutionally protected conduct."123 The answer to this question nec­
essarily requires knowledge of the meaning and scope of the statute in 
question. The majority, however, had already decided in its previous 
section, where it addressed the question of whether to certify, that the 
language of the Hunter statute was as broad as that of the ordinance in 
City ofHouston v. Hill.124 
Essentially, the Dorman court decided the merits of the constitu­
tional validity of the Connecticut Hunter statute when it decided not 
121. "As the willingness of federal courts to relax the rules of standing and to strike 
down ordinances in their entirety increases, so also does the incentive to prosecute in the 
federal courts." Hill v. City of Houston, 789 F.2d 1103, 1115 (5th Cir. 1986) (Higginbot­
ham, J., dissenting), aff'd, 482 U.S. 451 (1987). 
122. See Field, supra note 16, at 1109. Professor Field observes that to some extent a 
federal court must address the merits of state issues in order to make an abstention decision 
since the court should . only abstain when state law is unclear. Id. Arguably, this point 
extends to certification, which like abstention, is only proper when state law is unclear. 
123. Dorman v. Satti, 862 F.2d 432,436 (2d Cir. 1988) (quoting Village of Hoffman 
Estates v. The Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 494 (1982», cert. denied, 109 
S. Ct. 2450 (1989). 
124. Id. at 435. See supra notes 100-04 and accompanying text for the court's com­
parison of the Connecticut statute to the ordinance in Hill. 
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to certify questions of state law to the Connecticut Supreme Court. 
This evaluation of the merits stems from the test for certification 
which asks a federal court to determine whether a state statute is read­
ily susceptible to a state court narrowing construction. 
The court's analysis in Dorman shows that the test for certifica­
tion in an overbreadth context is directed at the wrong court. A first 
amendment overbreadth analysis necessarily requires an assessment of 
the statute's SCOpe.125. Nevertheless, federalism requires that federal 
courts abstain from deciding constitutional questions which are en­
twined with a state law issue so that state courts can provide authori­
tative interpretations of state law. 126 The issue of whether a statute is 
readily susceptible to a state court limiting construction is best left to 
state courts to decide as they are more familiar with the entire body of 
state law and may have more expertise in the understanding and con­
struction of state legislative intent.127 If a federal court can predict 
how a state court might interpret state law, a state is left with little 
remedy for an erroneous federal court construction of state law. 128 
Furthermore, the availability of certification in most states removes 
the need for a federal court to predict the scope of a state law. 129 
B. Narrowing Versus Rewriting 
A corollary to the "readily susceptible" standard is that a nar­
rowing construction must not be a rewriting of the statute. In City of 
Houston v. HiIl,13° the Supreme Court stated that "[a] federal court 
may not properly ask a state court if it would care in effect to rewrite a 
statute."l3l The Court provided no support for this rule. 
While a federal court may not provide a narrowing construction 
for state legislation,132 this limitation on federal court power does not 
125. See supra note 73. 
126. Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 501 (1941). 
127. Comment, supra note 35, at 867. 
128. See supra note 16. 
129. "Speculation by a federal court about the meaning of a state statute in the ab­
sence of prior state court adjudication is particularly gratuitous when ... state courts stand 
willing to address questions of state law on certification from a federal court." Brockett v. 
Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491,510 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring); see also Bel­
lotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 150-51 (observing that the availability of certification "helps 
build a cooperative judicial federalism" (quoting Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 
391 (1974»). 
130. 482 U.S. 451 (1987). 
131. Id. at 471. 
132. Virginia v. American Booksellers Ass'n, 484 U.S. 383,397 (1988) (The Supreme 
Court "will not rewrite a state law to conform it to constitutional requirements. "); see also 
Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 520 (1972) (Federal courts "lack jurisdiction authorita­
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preclude a state court from interpreting state law within constitutional 
boundaries. In State v. Williams,133 the Connecticut Supreme Court 
said that "unlike the United States Supreme Court, this court has the 
power to construe state statutes narrowly to comport with the consti­
tutional right of free speech."134 In addition, the Connecticut 
Supreme Court said in Moscone v. Manson 135 that: 
It is ... true that this court will not ordinarily construe a statute 
whose meaning is plain and unambiguous. This rule of statutory 
construction does not apply however if ... a literal reading places a 
statute in constitutional jeopardy. We are bound to assume that the 
legislature intended, in enacting a particular law, to achieve its pur­
pose in a manner which is both effective and constitutional. 136 
As Judge Miner noted in Dorman, Connecticut's severability law is 
further evidence of the state's power to confine state laws to their 
proper scope. 137 
Given that state courts have the power to interpret state laws and 
to confine them within the constitutional scope, federal courts cannot 
distinguish between a narrowing construction and a rewriting of the 
law. Federal courts cannot even agree on when a state statute is am­
biguous enough to warrant certification or abstention. 138 Addition­
tively to construe state legislation." (quoting United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 
402 U.S. 363, 369 (1971»). 
133. 205 Conn. 456, 534 A.2d 230 (1987). 
134. Id. at 473, 534 A.2d at 239 (citing Moscone v. Manson, 185 Conn. 124, 130-31, 
440 A.2d 848 (1981); Engle v. Personnel Appeal Bd., 175 Conn. 127, 134, 394 A.2d 731 
(1978». 
135. 185 Conn. 124, 440 A.2d 848 (1981). 
136. Id. at 128,440 A.2d at 851 (citations omitted). 
137. Donnan v. Satti, 862 F.2d 432, 438 (2d Cir. 1988) (Miner, J., dissenting). See 
supra notes 114-15 and accompanying text for a brief explanation of Connecticut's sever­
ability statute. 
138. See supra notes 88-117 and accompanying text for a discussion of the differing 
opinions on the certification issue in Dorman. Three other illustrations are relevant. 
Justice Powell, joined by Justice O'Connor and Chief Justice Rehnquist, dissented 
from the majority's decision not to certify in City of Houston v. Hill. See 482 U.S. 451, 
473-75 (1987) (powell, J., dissenting). See supra notes l00-OJ for a brief discussion of Hill. 
Justice Powell wrote that the ordinance, which prohibited anyone from opposing or inter­
rupting a police officer in the execution of his duty, was ambiguous because it lacked an 
explicit intent requirement, while the Texas Penal Code mandated "imputation of some 
culpability requirement." Hill, 482 U.S. at 473 (powell, J., dissenting). Similarly, at the 
appellate level, seven judges of a fifteen-member panel dissented from the majority's facial 
invalidation of the ordinance: 
Although the ordinance on its face may be susceptible to ttoubling construc­
tions, it need not be so construed. The state courts could, for example, easily find 
an intent requirement in the ordinance .... Similarly, the ordinance need not be 
construed as applicable to all police functions .... It certainly could be limited to 
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ally, if a federal court cannot consistently determine whether a statute 
is clear or unclear, then it cannot proceed further to make the determi­
nation that a limiting construction is really a rewriting of the stat-
lawful police functions, so that public challenges to unauthorized police activities 
would be unaffected. 
Hill v. City of Houston, 789 F.2d 1103, 1124 (5th Cir. 1986), aff'd, 482 U.S. 451 (1987). 
Likewise, disagreement over the meaning of a Washington state moral nuisance law 
produced a plurality opinion in Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491 (1985). 
The statute declared any place that exhibits lewd films as a regular course of business to be 
a moral nuisance. According to the statute, " 'lewd matter' is synonymous with 'obscene 
matter.''' Id. at 493 (quoting WASH. REv. CoDE § 7.48A.020(2) (1983». ObsCene matter 
was further defined to include any matter which" 'appeals to the prurient interest.''' Id. 
The statute also defined prurient as " 'that which incites lasciviousness or lust.''' Id. at 494 
(quoting WASH. REv. CoDE § 7.48A.OI0(8) (1983». The plurality reversed the lower 
court's complete facial invalidation and partially invalidated the law "insofar as the word 
lust was taken to include a normal interest in sex." Id. at 504-05. However, in her concur­
ring opinion, Justice O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist, 
noted that the Court should have abstained or certified to allow the state courts the oppor­
tunity to construe the Washington law. Id. at 507-10 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice 
O'Connor wrote: 
The Court of Appeals opined that the Washington statute is not susceptible 
to a limiting construction .... This assertion is simply implausible .... Both the 
text and the background of the Washington statute indicate that the state legisla­
ture sought to conform the moral nuisance law to the constitutional standards 
outlined by this Court in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). Moreover, the 
state courts have demonstrated their willingness to construe state obscenity laws 
in accord with Miller. 
Id. at 509 (citations omitted). For a complete discussion of Brockett, see Note, Federal 
Court Interpretation of the Washington Obscenity Statute-Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, 
Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2794 (1985),61 WASH. L. REV. 1237 (1986). 
Finally, even the most seemingly unambiguous statute may produce disagreement. 
See Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971). The Court in Constantineau facially 
invalidated a Wisconsin law which provided that certain persons could post a notice in 
retail liquor stores prohibiting the sale of intoxicating liquors to persons who, through ex­
cessive drinking, posed a danger to the community. Id. at 434. Since the statute contained 
no provision for notice or hearing, the Court held that the law was unambiguous and vio­
lated due process rights. Id. at 436-39. Despite the .1ack of notice and/or hearing provi­
sions, three justices dissented, arguing that the Court should have abstained to allow the 
Wisconsin courts to interpret the law. In one of the two dissenting opinions, Justice Black, 
joined by Justice Blackmun, noted that "[i]t seems ... wholly uncertain that the state law 
has the meaning it purports to have." Id. at 444 (Black, J., dissenting). Justice Black 
explained: 
[I]t is unfair to Wisconsin to permit its courts to be denied the opportunity of 
confining this law within its proper limits if it could be shown that there are other 
state law provisions that could provide such boundaries. For example, notice and 
hearing might be provided by principles of state administrative procedure law 
similar to the federal Administrative Procedure Act. 
Id. 
These cases illustrate the diverse spectrum of federal court interpretation of state law. 
The various opinions suggest that federal courts cannot consistently distinguish between a 
narrowing construction or a rewriting of a state law, since they cannot agree on what 
makes a statute ambiguous enough to warrant a state court construction in the first place. 
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ute.139 Furthermore, to focus on this seemingly empty distinction is to 
move further away from the essential purpose of certification. 
The purpose of certification is to provide state courts with the 
opportunity to rule on an issue of state law before a federal court ren­
ders a decision based upon an interpretation contrary to how the 
state's highest court would interpret the statute in question. l40 Ob­
taining an authoritative interpretation on a state law question allows a 
federal court to make a more accurate determination about the valid­
ity of the state law. 141 Considering the availability of certification pro­
cedures, federal courts should allow the state's highest court to render 
its interpretation of a state statute before a federal court invalidates it 
on its face. 142 
If federal courts are serious about recognizing state independence 
and maintaining an efficient federal judiciary, 143 they must realize the 
failings of the current test for certification in the facial overbreadth 
context and develop a test that better serves the purpose of 
certification. 
139. In fact, when the Supreme Court holds that a court may not rewrite a state 
statute, it does not offer any standard for knowing when a judicial interpretation is actually 
a rewriting of the law. See, e.g., Hill, 482 U.S. at 471; Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 
422 U.S. 205, 216 n.15 (1975). Perhaps this is because any interpretation may be an 
amendment to the statute insofar as the construction adds a new or different meaning to the 
statutory language. 
140. Dorman, 862 F.2d at 434-35. 
141. See Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167 (1959). In this abstention case, the 
Supreme Court said: 
All we hold is that these enactments should be exposed to state construction or 
limiting interpretation before the federal courts are asked to decide upon their 
constitutionality, so that federal judgment will be based on something that is a 
complete product of the State, the enactment as phrased by its legislature and as 
construed by its highest court. 
Id. at 178. 
142. A federal court need not accept a narrowing construction which is inconsistent 
with prior applications of the law. See Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 
(1969). However, where there is no prior application of the law, as in a facial overbreadth 
challenge to an unconstrued state statute, a federal court ought to ground its overbreadth 
determination on an accurate state court interpretation. See Hill, 482 U.S. at 475 (powell, 
J., dissenting) ("[T]he ambiguity of the ordinance, coupled with the seriousness of invali­
dating a state law, requires that we ascertain what the ordinance means before we address 
appellee's constitutional claims."); Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 510 
(1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Speculation by a federal court about the meaning of a 
state statute in the absence of prior state court adjudication is particularly gratuitous when 
. . . the state courts stand willing to address questions of state law on certification from a 
federal court. "). 
143. Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 501 (1941); Dorman, 862 F.2d 
at 434-35. 
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C. Proposal 
The seriousness of federal court invalidation of state policy re­
quires an authoritative interpretation of a state statute prior to a fed­
eral court invalidation of that statute. Therefore, this Note proposes 
that when federal courts review a facial overbreadth challenge to an 
unconstrued state statute, they seriously consider certification prior to 
a facial invalidation to ensure that any resulting interference with state 
policy is necessary and not premature. Federal courts should reflect 
upon the problems that occur when they fail to invoke available certifi­
cation procedures. 
Certification is clearly beneficial in the case of an ambiguous state 
statute, but considering that certification produces some additional ex­
pense and delay, it might appear desirable to allow a federal court to 
quickly invalidate an unambiguous state statute even in the absence of 
prior state court adjudication. The problem with such an assumption 
is that federal courts are inconsistent in determining when a state law 
issue is unclear enough to warrant abstention or certification.l44 Fur­
thermore, in a first amendment overbreadth challenge, the clarity of 
the statute in question is of critical importance since the analysis fo­
cuses on the scope of the law as it relates to protected expression. 145 
The importance of obtaining an accurate construction of the state stat­
ute suggests that federal courts should certify before prescribing the 
"strong medicine" 146 of facial invalidation. The Dorman court noted 
that certification should not be a device for shifting federal court bur­
dens to state courtS. 147 The Second Circuit's concern over the state 
court's docket is misplaced in the context of a facial overbreadth chal­
lenge to an unconstrued state statute. As the court of appeals admit­
ted, a state court's interest . in accepting questions for review is 
"particularly strong when it has not yet had the opportunity to inter­
pret the pertinent statutory language." 148 
Furthermore, state certification statutes limit the type of ques­
tions that the states' highest courts will accept, so that state courts 
144. "Where there is no ambiguity in the state statute, the federal court should not 
abstain but should proceed to decide the federal constitutional claim." Wisconsin v. Con­
stantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 439 (1971) (citing Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 250-51 
(1967». The Court, however, is unable to consistently determine when a statute is ambigu­
ous. See supra note 138. 
145. See supra note 73. 
146. See supra note 68 and accompanying text. 
147. Dorman, 862 F.2d at 435. 
148. Id. 
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have the discretionary power to decline to answer certain questions. 149 
These state statutory limits on certification should encourage federal 
courts to refrain from certifying questions which do not satisfy the 
minimal requirements of state certification statutes.lso Obviously, a 
federal court should not certify questions it knows the state will refuse 
to accept. If there is any doubt, however, a federal court should cer­
tify and allow the state court the opportunity to accept or decline to 
answer. A state court which declines to answer a certified question 
should be estopped from arguing premature interference with state 
policy. 
Certification before facial invalidation will further the principles 
of federalism which warn against unnecessary interference with state 
policy and unnecessary adjudication of constitutional questions. It 
will not, however, protect against the chilling effect when constitu­
tional rights are potentially at stake. lSI Consequently, interim relief 
during the certification process may be necessary. 
If the alternative would be facial invalidation of an unconstrued 
state statute because the fear of a chilling effect during the certification 
process is too great, a preliminary injunction against enforcement of 
the challenged state statute is a possible solution for alleviating any 
potential chilling effect. IS2 A preliminary injunction serves to protect 
149. Connecticut's certification statute limits certified questions to those that "may 
be determinative of the cause then pending ... and as to which it appears to the certifying 
court there is no controlling precedent in the decisions of the supreme court ofth[e] state." 
CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 51-199a(b) (1989). Most state certification statutes have similar lim­
iting language. 
Challenges to unconstrued state statutes necessarily satisfy the second requirement 
that state supreme court precedent is lacking. The requirement that the state law issue 
might be determinative of the case is more problematic and is one reason why state courts 
have declined to answer certified questions. See, e.g., Joseph v. Pima County, 158 Ariz. 
250,251,762 P.2d 537, 538 (1988) (Non-diversity litigants should not first remove cases to 
federal court only to ask for certification of state law questions.); White v. Edgar, 320 A.2d 
668, 677 (Me. 1974) (question of state law must be "susceptible of an answer ... [which] 
will produce a final disposition of the federal case"); Grant Creek Water Works, Ltd. v. 
Commissioner, 235 Mont. 1, 3, 775 P.2d 684, 685 (1988) ("[L]itigation may be settled 
solely on questions offederallaw."); Schlieter v. Carlos, 108 N.M. 507, 509, 775 P.2d 709, 
711 (1989) (questions certified not accompanied by sufficient JIlonhypothetical, evidentiary 
facts to evaluate constitutionality of state statute); Retail Software Servs. v. Lashlee, 71 
N.Y.2d 788, 790, 525 N.E.2d 737, 738, 530 N.Y.S.2d 91, 92 (1988) (answer to a certified 
question which would establish an abstract proposition would not satisfy the constitutional 
requirement that the question may be determinative of the pending action); Hachney v. 
Steighner, 549 P.2d 1310, 1311 (Wyo. 1976) (certified answer must dispose of the case one 
way or another). 
150. See 17A C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 15, § 4248, at 171 
(1988). 
151. See supra note 3 for an explanation of the "chilling effect." 
152. Technically, a preliminary injunction only protects the particular federal plain­
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the plaintiff from irreparable injury and to preserve the status quo un­
til the federal court renders a meaningful decision following a trial on 
the merits.1S3 
While interim relief may preserve the status quo and alleviate any 
chilling effect during the certification process, it also conflicts to some 
extent with the policies on which certification rests. I S4 First, interim 
relief necessarily interferes with state policy. ISS Second, a grant of in­
terim relief does not avoid the constitutional question since the deci­
sion to grant a preliminary injunction rests in part on a judicial 
evaluation of the merits.IS6 Third, because the federal court must in­
quire into the merits, the state court may take the preliminary deter­
mination as an indication of how the federal court will ultimately rule 
on the merits and may view the injunction as an attempt to force the 
state court into interpreting the state law in 'accordance with the fed­
eral court's preliminary determination. ls7 
Interim relief in the certification context poses a problem due to 
the requirement of a showing that the moving party is likely to suc­
ceed on the merits. ISS Just as it is undesirable for a federal court to 
address the merits of the state law issue prior to certification,ls9 it is 
similarly undesirable for a federal court to address the merits of the 
case to determine whether to grant interim relief.l60 Consequently, 
certification in situations involving facial overbreadth challenges to 
tiffs since the state is free to prosecute others who violate the contested statute. See Doran 
v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 931 (1975). Consequently, a temporary stay may not 
afford all potential plaintiffs with sufficient protection. However, if the plaintiff represents a 
class of people in a class action challenge to the contested statute, then a preliminary in­
junction would prohibit enforcement of the statute against all people in the particular class. 
Even if the plaintiff does not represent a class, the pending suit may encourage the state 
, prosecutor to wait for the final disposition before attempting further prosecutions under the 
challenged law. 
153. 11 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 2947, 
at 423 (1973); see also Wolf, Preliminary Injunctions: The Varying Standards, 7 W. NEW 
ENG. L. REv. 173, 174 (1984). 
154. Wells, Preliminary Injunctions and Abstention: Some Problems in Federalism, 
63 CoRNELL L. REv. 65, 75 (1977). 
ISS. Id. 
156. Id. at 68. 
157. Id. at 69. 
158. The traditional standard for granting a preliminary injunction requires a show­
ing that 1) in the absence of interim relief, the plaintiff will suffer irreparable injury and 2) 
that the plaintiff is likely to prevail on the merits. Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 
931 (1975). For a detailed history of the standards for granting interim relief, see generally 
Leubsdorf, The Standard/or Preliminary Injunctions, 91 HARV. L. REv. 525 (1978); Wolf, 
supra note 153. 
159. See supra notes 122-29 and accompanying text. 
160. See Wolf, supra note 153, at 230-33. 
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unconstrued state statutes is one area where federal courts should not 
focus on the plaintiff's likelihood of success on the merits and should 
apply an alternative standard. 161 
One possibility is to completely ignore the merits and balance the 
relative hardships to the opposing parties. 162 Under this standard the 
court could determine whether to grant interim relief based' on its 
analysis of the severity of the potential chilling effect and the compet­
ing state interest in enforcing the particular regulation. Alternatively, 
rather than completely ignoring the merits, a federal court could apply 
one of the less rigorous tests which asks whether the plaintiff raises a 
serious question regarding the merits. 163 If the federal court applies 
either of these alternative approaches that permit interim relief with­
out a showing that the plaintiff is likely to prevail on the merits, it will 
preserve the status quo and the principles of federalism by allowing 
state courts to rule on the state law issue. 
Even if the traditional "likelihood of success on the merits" stan­
dard is used to determine preliminary relief and federalism principles 
are violated, a grant of interim relief causes a less serious disruption of 
a state program than does a refusal to certify.t64 The preliminary in­
161. A departure from relying on the moving party's likelihood of prevailing on the 
merits is not without support. Some courts follow a less rigorous standard, which while 
still looking at the merits, does not require a showing that the moving party is likely to 
prevail. See. e.g., Dataphase Sys. v. C L Sys., 640 F.2d 109, 113 (8th Cir. 1981) ("(W]here 
the balance of other factors tips decidedly toward movant a preliminary injunction may 
issue if movant has raised questions so serious and difficult as to call for more deliberate 
investigation."); National Ass'n of Farmworkers Orgs. v. Marshall, 628 F.2d 604,616 n.52 
(D.C. Cir. 1980) ("An order maintaining the status quo is appropriate when a serious legal 
question is presented ...." (quoting Washington Metro. Area Transit Comm'n v. Holiday 
Tours, Inc., 559 F.2d 841, 844 (D.C. Cir. 1977»); Jackson Dairy, Inc. v. H.P. Hood & 
Sons, 596 F.2d 70, 72 (2d Cir. 1979) (injunction may issue if there are "sufficiently serious 
questions going to the merits"). For an in depth discussion and analysis of the varying 
standards for issuing preliminary injunctions, see generally Leubsdorf, supra note 158; 
Wolf, supra note 153. 
162. Nineteenth Century English and American precedents relied on equity doc­
trines to support the legal proposition that even where a movant's legal right to interim 
relief may be in doubt, the court may nevertheless issue an injunction if the moving party 
will suffer greater harm if the injunction is denied than the opposing party will suffer if the 
stay is granted. Wolf, supra note 153, at 177 (citing W. KERR, INJUNCTIONS IN EQUITY 
(1871». 
163. See Jackson Dairy, 596 F.2d at 72. Under the Jackson Dairy test, the court 
may grant interim relief when the moving party demonstrates that it will suffer irreparable 
harm, which means that a monetary award would not be. an adequate remedy. Addition­
ally, the moving party must show either that it is likely to succeed on the merits or that 
there are sufficiently serious questions on the merits to make them a fair ground for litiga­
tion. If the moving party demonstrates sufficiently serious questions on the merits, it must 
also show a balance of hardships that tips decidedly in its favor. Id. 
164. Wells, supra note 154, at 71; see also Note, supra note 138, at 1251. "The state 
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junction may influence the state court's answer to the question(s) certi­
fied, but the state court is not bound by the federal court's preliminary 
interpretation. 16S Thus, a grant of interim relief can prevent the chil­
ling effect during certification and will interfere less with state policy 
than would invalidation of the statute. Finally, if a federal court does 
not want to grant a formal preliminary injunction, the same objective 
is attainable if the state enforcement authority agrees not to prosecute 
during the certification process. 166 
CONCLUSION 
Certification represents the most reasonable way for federal 
courts to. protect individuals from unconstitutionally overbroad stat­
utes without unnecessarily interfering with state legislative policy. 
incurs much greater harm from inaccurate construction of the statute than from interim 
relief, which merely causes delay in achieving the state's objective and not total frustration 
of the objective itself." Id. at 1251-52. 
165. Wells, supra note 154, at 69. 
166. Id. at 84; see also supra note 152. 
Interim relief will relieve the chilling effect during the certification process, but a ques­
tion remains as to whether the state may retroactively enforce the statute if the federal 
court ultimately upholds the statute based upon a state court narrowing construction. 
Although beyond the scope of this note, retroactive enforcement would seem to undermine 
the prevention of the chilling effect and the reason for granting the interim relief in the first 
place, for a person may be just as deterred by delayed prosecution. 
Recently, the United States Supreme Court held that an overbreadth challenge to a 
Massachusetts state law became moot after the Massachusetts legislature amended the stat­
ute to cure its overbreadth. See Massachusetts v. Oakes, 109 S. Ct. 2633,2637-38 (1989). 
Concurring in the judgment that vacated and remanded the case for further proceedings as 
to whether the former version of the statute could be constitutionally applied to the appel­
lant, Justice Scalia dissented from the majority's belief that a facial overbreadth challenge is 
unavailable once the statute is amended. He noted that "[i]f the promulgation of overbroad 
laws ... was cost free, ... then legislatures would have significantly reduced incentive to 
stay within constitutional bounds in the first place." Id. at 2639-40 (Scalia, J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part). 
While acknowledging that legislators may not be as careful to avoid careless drafting if 
they know they can cure their own mistakes by amending the statute, the Court distin­
guished the situation in which a state court provides the narrowing construction. See Os­
borne v. Ohio, 110 S. Ct. 1691, 1702 (1990). Justice White noted that legislators cannot be 
certain that the statute they draft will be saved by a narrowing construction or invalidated 
for overbreadth. Despite the distinction, the Court observed that "[e]ven if construed to 
obviate overbreadth, applying the statute to pending cases might be barred by the Due 
Process Clause." Id. This is because the Due Process Clause requires fair warning to the 
defendant that the statute, as construed, covers his conduct. Id. at 1703 n.16. 
It seems, therefore, that even if a federal court grants interim relief during the certifica­
tion process and later upholds the challenged statute based upon a state court limiting 
construction, there could be no retroactive enforcement unless the defendant had fair no­
tice that his conduct was proscribed by the statute as construed by the state court. Thus, 
lost enforcement may be the necessary cost of preserving state policy when the alternative 
is a complete facial invalidation of state law. 
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Certification allows expeditious and authoritative construction of state 
law before federal courts evaluate the constitutionality of the statute. 
The focus of certification in facial overbreadth challenges to un­
construed state statutes should return to the federalism concerns it is 
designed to serve. Federal courts should abolish the discretionary 
"readily susceptible" test currently used in certification cases. The test 
is directed at the wrong court as it invites federal courts to rule on the 
merits of state law issues. Furthermore, the test is unworkable be­
cause it focuses on the illusive distinction between narrowly constru­
ing and rewriting a statute. 
A better solution for respecting federal-state court comity is to 
require certification before a federal court invalidates an unconstrued 
state statute because state courts are better equipped to evaluate the 
meaning and scope of state law. Interim relief during the certification 
process should alleviate any chilling effect on constitutionally pro­
tected rights. Any subsequent federal court invalidation is thus neces­
sary and not premature. 
Beth A. Hardy 
